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ARIUS AND ATHANASIUS ON  
THE PRODUCTION OF GOD’S SON
JT Paasch
Arius maintains that the Father must produce the Son without any pre-
existing ingredients (ex nihilo) because no such ingredients are available to 
the Father. Athanasius denies this, insisting not only that the Father himself 
becomes an ingredient in the Son, but also that the Son inherits his divine 
properties from that ingredient. I argue, however, that it is difficult to ex-
plain exactly how the Son could inherit certain properties but not others from 
something he is not identical to, just as it is difficult to explain the precise 
way that a statue inherits certain properties but not others from the lump of 
bronze it is made from.
According to the doctrine of the Trinity, God is three persons: the Father, 
Son, and Spirit. However, two of these persons, namely the Son and Spirit, 
are produced. The Son’s production is the simpler case, because every-
body in Christendom agrees that the Son is produced by the Father alone. 
The Spirit’s production is a little more complicated because some believe 
that the Spirit is produced by the Father alone, while others believe that 
the Spirit is produced by the Father and Son together. But either way, the 
point I want to highlight here is that some of the divine persons are pro-
duced. The question that interests me is this: how, exactly, does one divine 
person produce another? In this article, I want to look at two fourth-century 
attempts to explain how the Father produces the Son: that of Arius, and 
that of Athanasius.1
1In what follows, I will cite from the English translations of Arius’s and Athanasius’s 
works found in the widely available Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 2 [henceforth = 
NPNF 2], volumes 2–4 (New York: Christian Literature Publishing Company, 1890–1892). 
These translations are old, but they are generally reliable, and there is no need to refer to the 
Greek texts in an article such as this. Also, I should note that by selecting Arius and Athana-
sius, I do not mean to suggest that these are the two main ‘driving figures’ behind the fourth-
century controversies about the Trinity. On the contrary, I choose Arius and Athanasius only 
because most of us have heard of them. Modern scholarship has argued, persuasively I think, 
that Arius and Athanasius are just two among many important voices in their day. For ex-
ample, see the comments in Richard P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God 
(London: T. & T. Clark, 1988), pp. xvii–xxi; Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp. 11–15; and Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1987), pp. 1–25. For a thorough survey of these fourth-century 
controversies, see the whole of Hanson’s The Search.
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As is well known, Arius was a priest in Alexandria during the early 
decades of the fourth century, and he preached that the Father creates the 
Son out of nothing (ex nihilo). Arius’s teaching was quickly absorbed in a 
controversy that was spreading all over the Eastern Roman Empire, and 
eventually the Council of Nicea met in 325 CE to settle the dispute.
For a variety of complicated reasons though, Nicea did not solve the 
problem, and debate continued throughout the remainder of the century. 
By the middle of the fourth century, Athanasius had emerged as one of the 
most outspoken opponents of Arius’s teaching. According to Athanasius, 
the Son is not created out of nothing. Rather, he is begotten by the Father: 
God’s Son is a real son, produced similarly to the way that human sons are 
begotten by their fathers.
In what follows, I hope to explicate the theories of Arius and Athana-
sius with as much philosophical precision as I can. These authors are not 
always consistent, and they frequently speak in rather vague ways, so the 
specific details of their claims are not always evident. Nevertheless, I will 
try to extract from each author as clear a theory as I can.
Now, certain specialists (and non-specialists) might find my approach 
inappropriate. They might suggest that I am taking these authors’ words 
out of their historical context and subjecting them to overly literal philo-
sophical analysis. After all, one might say, Arius and Athanasius were not 
twenty-first century analytic philosophers, so it is a mistake to focus on 
the philosophical issues in abstraction from the exegetical, liturgical, sote-
riological, and ecclesiological issues that concerned such patristic writers 
and their communities.
In my opinion, this is a valid and important concern, and I do not 
mean to suggest that philosophy is the only thing that matters here. But 
I do believe that grappling with the philosophical technicalities of pa-
tristic theology is an important part of understanding the bigger picture. 
Besides, I have limited space in an article like this, so I simply cannot 
discuss the views of Arius and Athanasius in all their historical detail. 
What follows should be understood merely as an attempt to deal with 
just one aspect—the philosophical aspect—of the trinitarian theology of 
Arius and Athanasius.2
One other comment is in order here. I do not believe that all patristic 
authors held generally similar, or perhaps even compatible, views about 
the Trinity. Thus, although a specialist might point out that the Cappado-
cians and Augustine (who lived after Athanasius) addressed some of the 
issues I discuss here, I am wary of importing those later ideas onto earlier 
writers like Arius and Athanasius. As I see it, Arius and Athanasius are 
still trying to work out problems that later writers may (or may not) have 
2Athanasius himself is not opposed to using arguments against the Arians. Contra Arianos 
[= CA], 1.10 (NPNF 2, 4: 312): “Therefore, since all that remains is to say that from the devil 
came their [viz., the Arians’] mania (for of such opinions he alone is sower), proceed we to 
resist him . . . that, the Lord aiding us, and the enemy, as he is wont, being overcome with 
arguments, they may be put to shame.”
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‘solved,’ so I will examine Arius and Athanasius in light of the philosophi-
cal problems they grappled with.
Creation
As I said above, Arius maintains that the Son is created from nothing (ex 
nihilo), but Athanasius denies this. Much of the discussion depends on 
what these authors mean by creation. Before we go any further, it will 
be helpful to establish a working definition for ‘creating something from 
nothing.’ This requires some care, because we are after a definition that 
both Arius and Athanasius would agree to. But so long as we make the 
right qualifications, I think that Arius and Athanasius do agree on what it 
means to create something from nothing.
Just so we have a rough idea of what we are talking about, let me begin 
by describing creation in the following way: something is created from 
nothing if it is produced without any pre-existing ingredients. That is a 
very loose way of putting it, but it makes the basic idea clear enough. 
We know that things get produced with pre-existing ingredients all the 
time. Masons build walls with bricks and mortar, cavemen make charcoal 
with fire and wood, humans procreate with sperm and eggs, and so on. 
But none of that counts as creation. Something is created from nothing 
only when it is produced without any pre-existing ingredients. As I said 
though, that is a loose way of putting it, so let me explain more carefully 
what I mean.
(1) First then, let me clarify what I mean by an ingredient. Now, I admit 
that this term may suggest all sorts of things to a variety of readers. But 
I choose this label for lack of a better term, and other options seem even 
less helpful. For example, the word ‘part’ is far too narrow, and the word 
‘constituent’ has taken on a wide variety of meanings in contemporary 
philosophical literature. So I will use ‘ingredient’ simply because it does 
not have the philosophical baggage that words like ‘part’ or ‘constituent’ 
have, and I hope that allows me the freedom to define the word in the fol-
lowing way.
When I talk about an ‘ingredient’ in a product, I mean any sort of en-
tity which satisfies the following two conditions: (i) first, it exists in the 
product; and (ii) second, it bears its own properties—i.e., it has features 
that other ingredients in the product do not have, and which the prod-
uct itself does not have. (I choose these two conditions because they 
are the conditions that both Arius and Athanasius need to make their 
theories work.)
As for the first condition, I do not have a good definition for what it 
means to be ‘in’ a product, but this first condition is meant to rule out any-
thing the product is related to outside of itself. For instance, some believe 
that properties are abstract entities which exist somewhere ‘out there,’ and 
particular objects are related to those properties by exemplifying them. 
Such properties are not in the things that exemplify them, so they do not 
count as ingredients in my sense of the word. Properties (whatever they 
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are) only count as ingredients if they are actually in the product. (Thus, 
immanent universals and tropes might count as ingredients, depending 
on one’s view.)
The second condition is meant to rule out any ingredient that is totally 
identical to another ingredient, or which is totally identical to the whole 
product. For example, sometimes philosophers talk about an ‘improper 
part’ as something that is identical to the whole. Such improper parts 
would not be ingredients in my sense of the word, for they are identical 
to the whole.
This also rules out theories where a constituent is totally identical in 
some way to what it constitutes. For instance, some hold that when a 
lump of bronze is shaped like a statue, the bronze just is the statue, even 
though it is possible that this particular lump of bronze might not have 
ended up being this particular statue.3 On this reading, the bronze would 
not count as an ingredient in the statue, for the bronze just is (i.e., is identi-
cal to) the statue.
However, when I talk about ingredients that are not identical to other 
ingredients or to the whole product, I mean to rule out only absolute or 
total identity—i.e., the sort of identity where x and y are just the very same 
thing with all the very same properties. But I wish to allow weaker kinds 
of identity or sameness.
For instance, some entertain a kind of sameness where two things can 
be numerically the same, but not identical.4 On this view, a statue and the 
bronze it is made from are numerically the same object, but they are not 
identical, in which case the bronze would count as an ingredient of the 
statue in my sense of the word. These sorts of lesser identity or sameness 
are allowed here. All that is ruled out are ingredients that are completely 
and absolutely identical to another ingredient or the whole product.5 As I 
see it, if an ingredient is completely identical to another ingredient or the 
product, then it just is that ingredient or product, in which case there is no 
need to talk about it as if it were something distinct.
This allows a fairly wide range of entities to count as ingredients. Of 
course, a physical part, or any sort of proper part, counts as an ingredient. 
3See, for instance, Allan Gibbard, “Contingent Identity,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 
(1975), pp. 187–221.
4For example, Michael Rea, “Sameness without Identity: An Aristotelian Solution to the 
Problem of Material Constitution,” Ratio 11 (1998), pp. 316–328; Jeﬀrey Brower and Michael 
Rea, “Material Constitution and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 22 (2005), pp. 57–76; and 
Jeﬀrey Brower, “Abelard on The Trinity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, ed. Jeﬀrey 
Brower and Kevin Guilfoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 223–257. 
Lynne Rudder Baker also holds that constitution is a unity relation. See “Unity without Iden-
tity: A New Look at Material Constitution,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999), pp. 144–
165, and Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), especially pp. 27–58. 
5Note that this blocks problems for the Trinity that arise from the transitivity of identity. If 
some ingredient were absolutely identical to the Father, and if that same ingredient were also 
absolutely identical to the Son, then by the transitivity of identity, the Father and Son would 
be identical to each other. Neither Arius nor Athanasius would allow that, as we shall see.
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For example, the two sides of a pan each count as ingredients in the pan. 
They are not identical to each other or to the whole pan, and they each 
have their own features (as is clear when one side of the pan is hot and the 
other side is cool).
Constituents like Aristotle’s matter and form also count as ingredients 
in whatever they jointly compose, provided that they are not identical to 
each other when they compose the object in question. For instance, the 
body and soul that make up Socrates would count as ingredients in So-
crates, so long as they are in Socrates but are not identical to each other or 
to the whole body-soul composite.
(2) As for ‘pre-existing,’ I also acknowledge that this term has uncom-
fortable connotations, as I will indicate in a moment. But again, for lack of 
a better (or at least more economical) term, let me stipulate that I will use 
‘pre-existing’ in the following sense: an ingredient is a pre-existing ingre-
dient when it is not produced by the productive act that brings the product 
into being. So, for example, when a mason builds a brick wall, the mason 
causes the wall to come to exist, but not the bricks. The mason may have 
produced the bricks himself at some earlier time, in which case the mason 
is the producer of both the wall and the bricks, but since the mason pro-
duced the bricks by a diﬀerent productive act, the bricks are pre-existing 
ingredients in my sense of the word.
Alternatively, someone else might have produced the bricks, but 
again, in that case they would also be produced by a diﬀerent productive 
act. The bricks could even have been special eternal bricks that always 
existed and were never produced at all. But they would still be pre-exist-
ing ingredients in my sense of the word because they are not produced 
by the productive act that brings the wall into being, irrespective of time 
or producer.
Now, I should emphasize that I only use the term ‘pre-existing’ partly 
for lack of a better term (as I said), and partly because I think it readily 
brings to mind a rough idea of the kind of thing I mean. But the term 
might suggest that pre-existing ingredients must exist at some earlier 
point in time, and I do not mean to imply that. I mean to use ‘pre-existing’ 
in a sense that is neutral to any temporal reference. For our purposes here, 
a pre-existing ingredient can be an ingredient that does indeed exist be-
fore the product, but it can also be an ingredient that exists co-eternally 
with the product.
Further, the term ‘pre-existing’ might suggest that a pre-existing ingre-
dient is a contingent ingredient which might not have existed at all (at 
least in some world). But I do not mean to imply that either. I mean to use 
‘pre-existing’ with a sense that is modally neutral. Pre-existing ingredients 
can be contingent, or they can be necessary. By the same token, I do not 
mean to imply that a pre-existing ingredient must be capable of indepen-
dent existence. For our purposes here, pre-existing ingredients include 
both ingredients that are separable, and ingredients that are inseparable, 
from the product in question.
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With all that said, let me return to the notion of creation ex nihilo. Ear-
lier, I said that something is created from nothing when it is produced 
without any pre-existing ingredients. Now that I have made the sense of 
these terms somewhat clearer, I can formulate a more precise definition 
of creation. A producer creates a product from nothing if and only if the 
producer causes the product itself and each of its ingredients to come into 
being by the same productive act. Thus:
Creation:
For any x and y, x creates y from nothing
by a productive act P =df
(i) x causes y to exist by P, and
(ii) for any ingredient F in y,
x causes F to exist by P.
On this definition then, something is created from nothing if it is pro-
duced without any pre-existing ingredients, and something is not created 
from nothing if it is produced with at least one pre-existing ingredient (in my 
sense of these terms).
I presume that this definition applies in an extended sense to cases 
where multiple producers work together to create something from noth-
ing. Suppose, for example, that God the Father creates Socrates’ body, and 
God the Son creates Socrates’ soul. By my definition of creation, the Father 
alone does not create Socrates. He only creates Socrates’ body. Likewise, 
the Son does not create Socrates either, for he only creates Socrates’ soul. 
But taken as a single productive unit, the Father and Son jointly create 
Socrates from nothing.
Note also that by my definition of creation, an uncreated product can-
not be absolutely and utterly simple. For in order to be uncreated, the 
product must have at least one pre-existing ingredient, and on my terms, 
an ingredient cannot be absolutely identical with whatever it belongs to. It 
can be absolutely non-identical, or it can be non-identical in some weaker 
sense, but it cannot be totally identical with the product. Thus, an uncre-
ated product must have some ingredient that is distinct from the product 
in some way, so it cannot be totally simple.
This does not mean that an uncreated product cannot be simple in some 
weaker sense. After all, one could employ a weaker kind of identity or 
sameness and argue that although the product’s ingredients are not totally 
identical, they nevertheless are the same in some way. And in that case, the 
product would not be composed of really distinct parts or constituents, so 
it would still be simple in some sense.
The point, though, is that an uncreated product cannot be totally pro-
duced, for in order to be uncreated, it must have at least one pre-exist-
ing ingredient. That is, there must be something in the product that does 
not come into being with the product itself. Otherwise, all of the prod-
uct would come into being when it is produced, in which case the whole 
product would pop into existence, as it were, out of nothing.
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With all of that in mind, I want to turn now to the disagreement be-
tween Arius and Athanasius. As I said above, Arius thinks the Father cre-
ates the Son out of nothing, but Athanasius denies this. Let me look at each 
of these views in turn.
Arius
Very little of Arius’s writings have survived, so it is hard to say with any 
certainty what the details of his position actually are. Apparently, he au-
thored a poem (or maybe it was a hymn) called the Thalia, but only a few 
chunks are extant. Arius also wrote letters, three of which have survived 
in their entirety, and Arius makes his clearest statements about how the 
Father produces the Son in these letters.6
His position starts from the assumption that there is only one Unpro-
duced Producer.7 That is, however many beings there might be in the uni-
verse, only one of them is unproduced, and all of the others are produced 
by something else. I do not know why Arius believes this. Perhaps he knew 
of (or worked out himself) a philosophical argument for this conclusion,8 
or maybe he just wanted to be a good biblical monotheist. He does not 
say. All we know is that he was firmly committed to the idea of a single 
Unproduced Producer.
Still, Arius uses this idea in a particular way. He reasons that since there 
is only one Unproduced Producer, then for any two things, if one of them 
is not produced, then the other one must be produced. This goes for the 
Father and Son too: if one of them is not produced, then the other one 
must be. They cannot both be unproduced, and obviously the Father is 
the one who is not produced, so Arius concludes that the Son must be the 
one who is produced.9
We need to be careful about what this claim amounts to. It does not fol-
low, for example, that the Son is a creature. Of course, Arius does believe 
6The Thalia does say some things about the Son’s production, but given the high degree 
of uncertainty that we have about the Thalia (see Hanson, The Search, pp. 10–15), I will focus 
my attention on Arius’s letters.
7Arius, Letter to Alexander [= LA] (NPNF 2, 4: 458): “We acknowledge One God [viz., the 
Father], alone Ingenerate, alone Everlasting, alone Unbegun”; ibid., “God [viz., the Father], 
being the cause of all things, is Unbegun and altogether Sole”; ibid., “but God is before all 
things as being Monad and Beginning of all.”
8Exactly how much philosophy Arius knew is a difficult question, but arguments for a 
single Unproduced Producer were certainly floating around at the time (e.g., neoplatonic 
arguments for the One), and I see no reason why Arius would not have known about some 
of these arguments. For Plotinus’s argument that there is only one principle of all, see e.g., 
Lloyd Gerson, Plotinus (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp.  3–14, but see also Ger-
son’s comments on page 4 about how Plotinus’s argument is part of an older tradition.
9Arius, LA (NPNF 2, 4: 458): “but God [viz., the Father] is before all things as being Monad 
and Beginning of all. Wherefore also He is before the Son . . . as from God, He [viz., the Son] 
has being . . . in such sense is God his origin”; Letter to Eusebius [= LE] (NPNF 2, 3: 41): “But 
what we say and believe, and have taught, and do teach, that the Son is not unbegotten”; 
ibid., “He [viz., Alexander, the bishop of Alexandria at the time] has driven us out of the city 
as atheists, because we do not concur in what he publicly preaches, namely, God always, the 
Son always; as the Father so the Son; the Son co-exists unbegotten with God.” 
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that the Son is created (as we shall see), but it takes a few more steps to get 
to that conclusion. At this point in the argument, I see no reason to think 
that the fact that the Son is produced necessarily entails that the Son is also 
a creature.
Nor does it follow that the Son comes to exist at some particular point 
in time.10 Indeed, throughout history, various philosophers have believed 
that some productions are eternal. For instance, Christians believe the Son 
and Spirit are produced eternally, medieval Muslims like Avicenna believe 
creation is eternal, and so on.11 I take it, then, that the fact that something 
is produced does not necessarily entail that it is produced at some point 
in time.
Now, Arius sometimes says things like “before he was begotten, the 
Son did not exist.”12 That certainly makes it sound as if Arius thinks the 
Son began to exist at some point in time, and indeed, many of his contem-
poraries thought he meant just that. So there is no doubt that this kind of 
language is part of what got Arius into trouble.
But Arius sometimes qualifies these sorts of claims by pointing out that 
(as I read him) all he means is that the Son is produced.13 And I think 
this suggests that what Arius may have been trying to say is simply that 
the Son does not exist apart from his production. It very well may be that 
Arius just could not find a way of making this point without resorting to 
temporal language.
Besides, Arius often says that the Son was produced “before the ages.”14 
And by that, I do not think Arius is saying that the Son was produced, say, 
five minutes before the rest of creation. I think he means to say, as in fact 
he does say more than once, that the Son was produced outside of or apart 
10Athanasius too distinguishes between time and production, for he claims that a product 
or oﬀspring can be eternal. CA, 1.14 (NPNF 2, 4: 314): “When these points are thus proved, 
their [viz., the Arians’] profaneness goes further. ‘If there never was, when the Son was not’, 
say they, ‘but [yet] He is eternal, and coexists with the Father, [then] you [would have to] call 
Him no more the Father’s Son, but brother’. . . . For if we said only that He was eternally with 
the Father, and not His Son, their pretended scruple would have some plausibility; but if, 
while we say that He is eternal, we also confess Him to be Son from the Father, how can He 
that is begotten be considered brother of Him who begets?” 
11For more details on the Arabic tradition, see Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and 
Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human 
Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
12Arius, LA (NPNF 2, 4: 458): “[the Son] was not [in existence] before His generation.” 
13For example, in LE (NPNF 2, 3: 41), Arius claims that “before He [viz., the Son] was 
begotten. . . . He was not. For He was not unbegotten.” Note that after saying the Son did not 
exist before he was begotten, Arius qualifies this by saying “For He was not unbegotten.” I 
take this to mean that despite the temporal language, Arius is is trying to say that the Son 
does not exist apart from being begotten. 
14Arius, LA (NPNF 2, 4: 458): “We acknowledge One God [viz., the Father] . . . who begat 
an Only-begotten Son before eternal times”; ibid., “but, as we say, at the will of God, [the Son 
was] created before times and before ages”; ibid., “the Son being begotten apart from time 
by the Father, and being created and founded before ages”; LE (NPNF 2, 3: 41): “He [viz., the 
Son] has subsisted before time, and before ages”; Letter to Constantine (NPNF 2, 2: 28): “Christ 
his Son, who was begotten of him before all ages.”
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from time.15 This suggests, to me at least, that Arius may have believed 
that the Son is timeless.
Thus, when Arius says that the Son is produced and the Father is not, I 
think that is all he is trying to say at this point in the argument; the tempo-
ral and/or creaturely character of the Son has not yet entered the picture. 
The claim, then, is only that the Son is produced: he somehow gets his be-
ing from the Father, while the Father is not produced at all.16
This is a totally uncontroversial claim. All orthodox Christians main-
tain that the Father and Son are not two independent Gods up in heaven. 
As the Creeds say, the Father begets the Son, so there is nothing contro-
versial about saying that the Son is produced by the Father in some way 
or other.
The controversial stuﬀ shows up when Arius tries to explain how the 
Son is produced. As Arius sees it, if the Father produced the Son with 
any pre-existing ingredients, he would either have to use created ingredi-
ents, or he would have to use some ingredient taken from within himself 
(those are the only two options). But Arius thinks neither of these are 
open to the Father.
The Father could not, for instance, produce the Son with any created 
ingredients, because the Son is produced ‘before’ anything else. We might 
recall a Bible verse on Arius’s behalf: the Son is the “firstborn of all cre-
ation” (Col. 1:15), so when it comes time to produce the Son, so to speak, 
there simply isn’t anything lying around that the Father could use.17
But the Father could not use any of his own ingredients to produce the 
Son either, for Arius believes that the Father is utterly simple. That is, the 
Father does not have any ingredients, so he cannot be broken down or 
analyzed into anything more fundamental. The Father is just one, indivis-
ible thing.
By way of contrast, consider something that does have distinct ingre-
dients. A pan, for example, can be hot on one side, and it can be cool on 
the other side. But this is only because the pan has diﬀerent parts that can 
have their own features. If a pan were utterly simple (as the Father is), the 
whole thing would have to be hot, or the whole thing would have to be 
cold. It could not be partly hot or partly cold.
15Arius, LA (NPNF 2, 4: 458): “but [the Son] being begotten apart from time before all 
things.” See also the same phrasing quoted in the previous note. 
16Arius makes this point negatively by insisting that the Son is not unbegotten, but to 
put it positively, the point is that the Son is begotten or produced. LA (NPNF 2, 4: 458): “For 
He [viz., the Son] is not eternal or co-eternal or co-unoriginate with the Father, nor has He 
His being together with the Father, as some speak of relations, introducing two ingenerate 
beginnings”; LE (NPNF 2, 3: 41): “Some of them [viz., heretics] say that the Son is . . . also 
unbegotten [like the Father]. These are impieties to which we cannot listen”; ibid., “We are 
persecuted, because we say that the Son has a beginning, but that God [viz., the Father] is 
without beginning.”
17Arius, LE (NPNF 2, 3: 41): “He [viz., the Son] is [produced] of the non-existent” (or, to 
put it more straightforwardly, “the Son is produced from what is not,” or even better, “the 
Son is not produced from anything in existence”); ibid., “He [viz., the Son] does not derive 
His subsistence from any matter.”
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This highlights what it means for the Father to be utterly simple in the 
sense that he does not have any ingredients: anything in the Father is, 
strictly speaking, completely identical to the Father. We cannot say that 
one portion of the Father has some feature that another portion, or the 
Father himself, does not have. Any feature that can be found in the Father 
belongs simply to the Father himself, not to some part or portion or ingre-
dient in the Father.
This is very important for our whole discussion. Arius believes, of 
course, that the Father is God, but since the Father is utterly simple, then 
whatever it is that makes the Father God (and let me just call it the God-
hood), it cannot be an ingredient in the Father. Rather, it must be absolute-
ly identical to the Father. According to Arius then, the Father just is God.
This also means, so far as Arius is concerned, that the Father cannot 
break oﬀ a part of himself and use it as an ingredient in the Son. The Fa-
ther has no ingredients, so he simply cannot produce the Son with some 
ingredient taken from within himself.18 But that exhausts all the options, so 
Arius concludes that the Father therefore has to produce the Son without 
any pre-existing ingredients whatsoever. And according to the definition 
of creation I gave above, that means the Son is created from nothing.19
Now, one might think that Arius has overlooked an obvious option, 
namely that the Father himself could be an ingredient in the Son. I do not 
know why Arius never discussed this possibility. Perhaps he did and that 
text has not survived, or perhaps he just rejected it because he thought it 
would make the Son complex rather than simple. But whatever the case, 
we will see in the next section that Athanasius focuses on this very point 
and uses it to his advantage.
Athanasius
Athanasius denies that the Son is created from nothing. As he sees it, the 
Son is begotten, and here, begetting (or generating, as it is also called) is 
a technical term for the natural process of procreation, as when living or-
ganisms produce oﬀspring. For Athanasius, the Son really is a son: he is 
the natural oﬀspring of the Father.20
18Arius, LE (NPNF 2, 3: 41), “the Son is not . . . in any way part of the unbegotten [Father]”; 
LA (NPNF 2, 4: 458): “nor [is it true] as Manichaeus taught that the oﬀspring was a portion of 
the Father”; ibid., “But if the terms ‘from him’ [Rom. 11:36], and ‘from the womb’ [Ps. 110:3], 
and ‘I came from the Father, and I am come’ [John 16:28], be understood by some to mean as 
if a part of Him [viz., the Father] . . . then the Father is according to them compounded and 
divisible,” and Arius clearly thinks it would be absurd for God the Father to be divisible. 
19Arius, LE (NPNF 2, 3: 41): “We are persecuted . . . [for saying that the Son is not pro-
duced from anything in existence]. And this we say, because He [viz., the Son] is neither part 
of God [viz., the Father], nor of any essential being [viz., anything else in existence].” 
20Athanasius often distinguishes between adopted sons and natural sons, and he always 
insists that God’s Son is a natural son, not an adopted son. De Decretis [= DD], 6 (NPNF 2, 
4: 154): “Now it may serve to . . . ask . . . what in fact a son is. . . . In truth, Divine Scripture 
acquaints us with a double sense of this word:—one which Moses sets before us in the Law 
[viz., being a son by adoption] . . . —and the other sense, that in which Isaac is son of Abra-
ham, and Jacob of Isaac. . . . If in the first, which belongs to those who gain the name [son] by 
392 Faith and Philosophy
Athanasius does not, so far as I know, ever explain exactly how he un-
derstands the process of procreation, but I think we can extract the general 
picture from three of his comments. The first statement I want to highlight 
appears at a point where Athanasius is trying to explain why human fa-
thers can sire many children rather than one. There, he says human fathers 
beget by losing a part of their substance, but they can regain what they 
have lost by eating some food, and for that reason, men can sire many 
children over time.21
Apparently, Athanasius believes that once a man has impregnated a 
woman (or women) enough times, he cannot do it again until he has had 
a good meal. When a man gives up his seed, he is, in eﬀect, giving up a 
part of his substance, so he can only give up his seed so many times before 
he is running on empty, as it were. But when food is broken down and 
processed in the body, it replenishes the portion of substance he has lost, 
at which point he can give up his seed again.
I do not know what Athanasius means here when he talks about a fa-
ther’s ‘substance.’ The Greek word he uses is ousia, and that of course is a 
very vague term. Maybe Athanasius has something material in mind; after 
all, he says it can be replenished by food. On the other hand, maybe he is 
thinking it is an individualized human nature that gets repeated in each 
child. But these are just guesses. Athanasius does not, to my knowledge, 
ever say just what he means here, so I am going to retain the ambiguity of 
ousia by continuing to use the equally vague English term ‘substance.’22
In any case, the point to glean from this is that for Athanasius, fathers 
give a part of their substance to their children, and their children spring 
forth from or grow out of that portion of their father’s substance. To cap-
ture this idea, Athanasius often uses the metaphor of light radiating out 
of the sun, or water flowing out of a fountain: a son ‘comes out of’ or ‘is 
produced from’ his father’s substance.23
grace from moral improvement, . . . then He [viz., God’s Son] would seem to diﬀer from us 
in nothing; no, nor would He be Only-begotten, as having obtained the title of Son as others 
from His virtue”; CA, 1.8 (NPNF 2, 4: 310): “and how shall he not err . . . who is simply igno-
rant of the Son’s genuine and true generation from the Father?”; ibid., 1.16 (NPNF 2, 4: 316): 
“He [viz., the Son] is His [the Father’s] proper oﬀspring from His [the Father’s] essence”; 
ibid., 2.72 (NPNF 2, 4: 388): “the Word of God is not a creature but true Son, and by nature 
genuine, of the Father.”
21Athanasius, DD, 11 (NPNF 2, 4: 157): “For the oﬀspring of men are portions of their 
fathers, since the very nature of bodies is not uncompounded, but in a state of flux, and 
composed of parts; and men lose their substance in begetting, and again they gain substance 
from the accession of food. And on this account men in their time become fathers of many 
children.”
22For a useful study of the concept of substance in Patristic theology, see Christopher 
Stead, Divine Substance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), and “The Concept of Divine Sub-
stance,” Vigiliae Christianae 29 (1975), pp. 1–14.
23Athanasius, CA, 1.27 (NPNF 2, 4: 322): “[the Arians should] inquire of the sun concern-
ing its radiance, and of the fountain concerning its issue. They will find that these, though 
oﬀspring, always exist with those things from which they are”; ibid., 1.14 (NPNF 2, 4: 315): 
“But if He is Son, . . . and [if] ‘son’ is nothing else than what is generated from the Father; 
. . . [then] what is to be said but that, in maintaining ‘Once the Son was not’, they [viz., the 
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The second comment to note about procreation is this: Athanasius often 
says that creatures and works of art are produced externally, while sons 
are produced internally. Works of art are produced ‘externally’ from other 
materials, and creatures are produced ‘externally’ from nothing at all. But 
sons are produced ‘internally’ from their father’s substance.24
I think the point here is that the bit of substance a son gets from his 
father counts as a pre-existing ingredient (in my sense of the word). 
Thus, when a father gives his seed to a woman, that bit of his substance 
then becomes one of the ingredients that goes into forming a zygote in 
the mother’s womb.25 (Classical authors did not know about zygotes, of 
course, but I think we can extrapolate on their behalf.) That is why sons 
do not count as creatures. A son is produced with at least one pre-existing 
ingredient, namely a bit of his father’s substance, so a son is not created 
from nothing.26
Arians] . . . openly predicate of Him that . . . the Light was once without radiance, and the 
Fountain was once barren and dry?”; DD, 23 (NPNF 2, 4: 165): “Again, the illustration of the 
Light and the Radiance has this meaning. For the Saints have not said that the Word was 
related to God as fire kindled from the heat of the sun, which is commonly put out again, for 
this is an external work and a creature of its author, but they all preach of Him as Radiance, 
thereby to signify His being from the essence, [which is] proper and indivisible, and His one-
ness with the Father.” Also, CA, 1.37 (NPNF 2, 4: 328): “For what is from another by nature, is 
a real oﬀspring, as Isaac was to Abraham, . . . and the radiance to the sun”; De Synodis [= DS], 
45 (NPNF 2, 4: 474): “the Bishops who anathematized the Arian heresy . . . acknowledging 
that the Word was not a creature, but an oﬀspring from the essence, and that the Father’s es-
sence was the origin and root and fountain of the Son, and that he was . . . not of [a] diﬀerent 
nature, as we are, and separate from the Father, but that, as being from Him, He exists as Son 
indivisible, as radiance is with respect to Light, . . . on these grounds [the Bishops] reasonably 
asserted . . . that the Son was Coessential [homoousios].”
24Athanasius, CA, 1.29 (NPNF 2, 4: 323): “Let it be repeated then, that a work is external to 
the nature [of its producer], but a son is the proper oﬀspring of the essence [of his father]”; 
ibid., 2.57 (NPNF 2, 4: 379): “creatures are from without, and are works of the Maker; but the 
Oﬀspring is not from without nor a work, but from the Father, and proper to His Essence. 
Wherefore, they are creatures; this God’s Word and Only-begotten Son”; ibid., 2.2 (NPNF 2, 
4: 349): “[the term] Son implies something proper to Him and truly from . . . [the Father’s] 
Essence; but what is from His will, comes into consistence from without”; ibid., 2.3 (NPNF 2, 
4: 349): “a son is confessed to be not external to his father but from him”; ibid., 3.62 (NPNF 
2, 4: 427): “A man by counsel builds a house, but by nature he begets a son; and what is in 
building began to come into being at will, and is external to the maker; but the son is proper 
oﬀspring of the father’s essence, and is not external to him”; ibid., 1.26 (NPNF 2, 4: 322): 
“Those who ask of parents, and say, ‘Had you a son before you begot him?’ should add, ‘And 
if you had a son, did you purchase him from without as a house or any other possession?’ 
And then you would be answered, ‘He is not from without, but from myself’.”
25Does Athanasius think the mother contributes any ingredients to the zygote? I have not 
found a place where he says either way. Athanasius generally does not speak very highly of 
women, and since he thinks God’s Son is produced without a mother, he might think that 
mothers do nothing more than provide a zygote with shelter and nourishment in the womb. 
Origen and Tertullian seemed to think this (Stead, Divine Substance, p. 229), and I would not 
be surprised if Athanasius believed it too. But this is just a guess. It is also possible that Atha-
nasius held some other theory of procreation that was common in his day, e.g., Aristotle’s 
theory that the mother’s menstrual material becomes the ‘matter’ of the zygote. 
26I take it that this is Athanasius’s point in the following passages. CA, 1.13 (NPNF 2, 4: 
314): “it follows . . . that the Son did not come out of nothing, nor is in the number of origi-
nated things at all”; ibid., 2.11 (NPNF 2, 4: 354): “the Son is not a work, but in Essence indeed 
the Father’s oﬀspring”; ibid., 2.22 (NPNF 2, 4: 360): “how can He [viz., the Son] be Word 
394 Faith and Philosophy
Third, Athanasius often says that when a father procreates, he produces 
something that is the same kind of thing as himself. Creators and artists, 
on the other hand, make things that are diﬀerent in kind. And the reason 
is that sons come from their father’s substance, while creatures and works 
of art do not.27
What I gather here is that however else we might want to characterize 
the bit of substance a human zygote gets from the father’s seed, that bit of 
substance includes a human nature.28 That is, it provides the zygote with all 
the properties it needs in order to be (or develop into) a member of human 
kind. Thus, human children quite literally get their human natures from 
their fathers.29
and Wisdom, unless He be the proper oﬀspring of His [viz., the Father’s] essence, and did 
not come to be, as others, out of nothing?”; ibid., 2.48 (NPNF 2, 4: 374): “no one says that He 
begets what He creates, nor calls His proper oﬀspring creatures”; ibid., 1.9 (NPNF 2, 4: 311): 
“[The Son is the] Very Son of the Father, natural and genuine, proper to His essence, . . . not 
a creature or work, but an oﬀspring proper to the Father’s essence”; ibid., 2.5 (NPNF 2, 4: 
351): “He is not in the number of works, nor in short of things originate, but the Oﬀspring 
of the Father.”
27Athanasius, CA, 3.9 (NPNF 2, 4: 398): “For all other things subsisted out of nothing . . . , 
and are greatly diﬀerent in nature; but the Son Himself is natural and true Oﬀspring from the 
Father”; ibid., 3.13–14 (NPNF 2, 4: 401–402): “So also when the Son is beheld, so is the Father, 
for He is the Father’s radiance; and thus the Father and the Son are one. But this is not so 
with . . . creatures; . . . for greatly, or rather wholly, do things by nature originate diﬀer from 
God the Creator. . . . And the Word, as being not separate from the Father, nor unlike and 
foreign to the Father’s Essence”; ibid., 3.15 (NPNF 2, 4: 402): “For either they [viz., the Arians] 
will say that the Word is not God; or saying that He is God . . . but not proper to the Father’s 
Essence, they will introduce many because of their [viz., the Father’s and Son’s] diﬀerence of 
kind. . . . But let this never even come into our mind. For there is but one form of Godhead, 
which is also in the Word”; ibid., 3.20 (NPNF 2, 4: 405): “For like things are naturally one 
with like; thus all flesh is ranked together in kind; but the Word is unlike us and like the 
Father”; ibid., 1.58 (NPNF 2, 4: 340): “therefore the Son is diﬀerent in kind and diﬀerent in 
essence from things originate, and on the contrary is proper to the Father’s essence and one 
in nature with it.”
28Or perhaps the bit of substance a father gives to his child just is an individualized hu-
man nature. But that is just a guess too, for it is not clear what either Arius or Athanasius 
think about the individuation of natures. They both talk about a father’s ‘substance’ (ousia) 
getting divided up when he produces oﬀspring, and if they take ousia to mean ‘nature’ (Aris-
totle’s secondary substance) rather than an ‘individual’ (Aristotle’s primary substance), then 
they may think that natures are divided by the individuals that exemplify them. But whether 
or not this is right, the important point for our purposes is simply that Arius and Athanasius 
both believe that in human reproduction, the father’s ‘substance’ (whatever it is) is divided 
up—that is, a part is broken oﬀ and given to the oﬀspring—while in divine production, the 
Father’s substance cannot be divided in this way. (We have already seen that Arius believes 
this, but we will see below that Athanasius believes this too.)
29Athanasius, CA, 1.26 (NPNF 2, 4: 321): “Plainly, if they [viz., the Arians] inquire of par-
ents concerning their son, let them consider whence is the child which is begotten. For grant-
ing the parent had not a son before his begetting, still, after having him, he had him, not as 
external or as foreign, but as from himself, and proper to his essence and his exact image”; 
DS, 51 (NPNF 2, 4: 477): “it is thereby confessed that what is generated from any thing, is 
coessential with that which generated it. . . . For should it happen that there were not two 
brothers, but that only one had come of that essence, he that was generated would not be 
called alien in essence . . . but though alone, he must be coessential with him that begat him 
. . . this is a property of children with reference to their parents. And in like manner also, 
when the fathers said that the Son of God was from His essence, reasonably have they spo-
ken of Him as coessential.”
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This is not so for creatures and works of art. God created Adam, but he 
did not give Adam his divine nature. Michaelangelo sculpted the David 
statue, but he did not give the statue a human nature. Of course, creators 
and artists can give their image or likeness to a product, but that is not the 
same thing as giving it their nature.30
Athanasius thinks this basic model applies to God too, though he is 
careful to make an important qualification: human fathers beget sons by 
giving up a part of their substance, but God the Father gives his whole self 
to his Son, not a part. The reason for this is that like Arius, Athanasius be-
lieves the Father is utterly simple. There are no ingredients in the Father, 
so anything in the Father is, strictly speaking, absolutely identical to the 
Father.31 (Thus, like Arius, Athanasius agrees that the Godhood is not an 
ingredient in the Father; rather, it just is the Father.)
As we saw before, Arius infers from this that the Father cannot break 
oﬀ a part of himself, and that led him to conclude that the Father must 
create the Son out of nothing.32 Athanasius agrees that the Father cannot 
break oﬀ a part of his substance, but Athanasius thinks Arius has not seen 
all the available options. The Father’s utter simplicity entails only this: if 
the Father is going to give any of his substance to the Son, he has got to 
give the whole thing, or none at all. It is not a question of a part; it is a 
question of all or none.33
30Athanasius, DD, 13 (NPNF 2, 4: 158): “For what man . . . does not perceive, that what are 
created and made are external to the maker; but the Son . . . exists not externally, but from the 
Father who begat Him? for man too both builds a house and begets a son, and no one would 
reverse things, and say . . . that the house was an image of the maker, but the son unlike him 
who begat him; but rather he will confess that the son is an image of the father, but the house 
a work of art”; ibid., 23 (NPNF 2, 4: 165–166): “Indeed, if we say that the Word is from the 
essence of God . . . what does this mean but the truth and eternity of the essence from which 
He [viz., the Son] is begotten? for it is not diﬀerent in kind. . . . Nor is He like only outwardly, 
lest He seem in some respect or wholly to be other in essence, as brass shines like gold and 
silver like tin. For these are foreign and of other nature, . . . nor is brass proper to gold, nor 
is the pigeon born from the dove; but though they are considered like, yet they diﬀer in 
essence”; DS, 48 (NPNF 2, 4: 475): “For if the Word [viz., the Son] be a work and foreign to 
the Father’s essence, so that He is separated from the Father by the diﬀerence of nature, He 
cannot be one in essence with Him, but rather He is homogeneous by nature with the works. 
. . . On the other hand, if we confess that He is not a work but the genuine oﬀspring of the 
Father’s essence, it would follow that He is inseparable from the Father, being connatural, 
because He is begotten from Him.”
31Athanasius, CA, 1.28 (NPNF 2, 4: 322): “But with God [viz., the Father] this cannot be; 
for He is not composed of parts, but being impassible and simple, He is impassibly and in-
divisibly Father of the Son.” And a little later in the same paragraph, when speaking about 
the Arians, Athanasius says (NPNF 2, 4: 323): “why speculate they [viz., the Arians] about 
passions and parts in the instance of the immaterial and indivisible God[?]”
32As Athanasius clearly recognizes. CA, 1.15 (NPNF 2, 4: 315): “they [viz., the Arians] 
deny that the Son is the proper oﬀspring of the Father’s essence, on the ground that this must 
imply parts and divisions.”
33Athanasius, DD, 11 (NPNF 2, 4: 157): “but God, being without parts, is Father of the Son 
without partition or passion; for there is neither effluence of the Immaterial, nor influx from 
without, as among men; and being uncompounded in nature, He is Father of One Only Son”; 
ibid., 24 (NPNF 2, 4: 166): “in like manner when we hear the phrase ‘one in essence’, let us 
not fall upon human senses, and imagine partitions and divisions of the Godhead, but . . . 
let us preserve undivided the oneness of nature”; CA, 1.28 (NPNF 2, 4: 322): “nor [must] the 
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Of course, Athanasius denies that the Son is created without any in-
gredients, so he cannot say that the Father gives none of his substance to 
the Son. Thus, he goes with the former option: the Father gives the Son 
his whole self.34 Like human fathers then, God the Father begets God the 
Son by giving his substance to the Son. But unlike human fathers, God the 
Father gives his whole self to the Son, and not just a part of himself. For 
Athanasius then, the Father himself is an ingredient in the Son.35
This allows Athanasius to draw some important conclusions. First of all, 
by saying that the Son is produced from the Father’s substance, Athanasius 
can say that the Son is not created. Like human sons, God’s Son is pro-
duced with at least one pre-existing ingredient, namely the Father himself, 
and that is enough to show that the Son is not created from nothing.36
Son [be] considered to be part of God, nor the generation to imply any passion whatever”; 
ibid., 2.34 (NPNF 2, 4: 366): “For if in the case of these originate and irrational things [e.g., the 
sun] oﬀsprings [e.g., the sun’s radiance] are found which are not parts of the essences from 
which they are, nor subsist with passion, nor impair the essences of their originals [e.g., as 
the radiance of the sun does not divide the sun’s essence but rather contains and expresses 
all of it], are they [viz., the Arians] not mad again in seeking and conjecturing parts and pas-
sions in the instance of the immaterial and true God, and ascribing divisions to Him who is 
beyond passion and change, thereby to perplex the ears of the simple and to pervert them 
from the Truth?”
34Athanasius, CA, 1.16 (NPNF 2, 4: 316): “that which is begotten [viz., the Son] is neither 
aﬀection nor division of that blessed Essence [of the Father]. Hence it is not incredible that 
God should have a Son, the Oﬀspring of His own essence; nor do we imply aﬀection or 
division of God’s essence, when we speak of ‘son’ and ‘Oﬀspring’”; ibid., 2.32–33 (NPNF 
2, 4: 366): “[The Arians ask:] How can the Son be from eternity? or how can He be from the 
Father’s Essence, yet not a part? since what is said to be of another, is a part of him; and what 
is divided, is not whole. These are the evil sophistries of the heterodox . . . we see that the 
radiance from the sun is proper to it, and the sun’s essence is not divided or impaired; but its 
essence is whole and its radiance perfect and whole, without impairing the essence of light, 
but as a true oﬀspring from it. We understand in like manner that the Son is begotten not 
from without but from the Father, and . . . the Father remains whole.” 
35Athanasius, CA, 3.6 (NPNF 2, 4: 396): “Nor is this Form of the Godhead [in the Son] par-
tial merely, but the Fulness [sic] of the Father’s Godhead is the Being of the Son, and the Son 
is whole God . . . the Godhead and the Form of the Son is none other than the Father’s”; ibid., 
3.5 (NPNF 2, 4: 396): “for the Godhead of the Son is the Father’s, and it is in the Son”; ibid., 3.5 
(NPNF 2, 4: 396): “it must necessarily be understood that the Godhead and propriety of the 
Father is the Being of the Son”; ibid., 3.6 (NPNF 2, 4: 396): “the Father’s Form which is in Him 
[viz., the Son] shews in Him the Father; and thus the Father is in the Son”; ibid., 3.3 (NPNF 2, 
4: 395): “For the Son is in the Father, . . . because the whole Being of the Son is proper to the 
Father’s essence, as radiance from light, and stream from fountain. . . . For the Father is in 
the Son, since the Son is what is from the Father and proper to Him, . . . for whoso thus con-
templates the Son, contemplates what is proper to the Father’s Essence, and knows that the 
Father is in the Son. For . . . the Form and Godhead of the Father is the Being of the Son.” 
36When the Scriptures speak of the Word coming into being in some way or other, Atha-
nasius consistently argues that this refers to the Word becoming incarnate. It does not, says 
Athanasius, refer to the Son’s Godhood coming into being. For Athanasius, the Godhood in 
the Son is not produced, and that fits my definition of a pre-existing ingredient. E.g., CA, 1.60 
(NPNF 2, 4: 341): “let them [viz., the Arians] know that Paul does not signify that His [viz., 
the Son’s] essence has become”; ibid., 1.62 (NPNF 2, 4: 342): “who does not see that he [viz., 
Paul] has not used the word ‘become’ of the essence of the Word. . . . Let them [viz., the Ari-
ans] cease therefore to take the word ‘become’ of the substance of the Son”; ibid., 1.64 (NPNF 
2, 4: 343): “And the words ‘Become my strong rock’ do not denote that the essence of God 
Himself became, but His loving kindness, as has been said, so also here [these words] do not 
signify that the essence of the Word is originate (perish the thought!)”; ibid., 2.67 (NPNF 2, 
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Second, Athanasius can say that God’s Son is divine just like his Father. 
God’s Son inherits his divine properties from the substance he gets from 
his Father, just as human sons inherit their human properties from the 
substance they get from their fathers.37 But since the Father’s substance is 
not divided up, the Son is homoousios (same in substance) with his Father 
in a quite literal sense. God’s Son does not just have the same kind of sub-
stance as his Father; he has numerically the same substance.38
There is one more important point to notice here. Even though the 
whole Father is an ingredient in the Son, Athanasius thinks the Father 
is not identical to the Son. As I explained above, an ingredient cannot be 
identical to the product in question, and that applies in the Son’s case too. 
Besides, if the Father were identical to the Son, that would amount to mo-
dalism, and Athanasius explicitly rejects that (as does Arius).39 So even 
4: 385): “Not of His [viz., the Son’s] essence then is ‘He created’ [in Pr. 8:22] indicative, as has 
many times been said, but of His bodily generation.”
37Athanasius, CA, 2.22 (NPNF 2, 4: 360): “the Son’s Essence is proper to the Father, and He 
in all points like Him”; ibid., 3.16 (NPNF 2, 4: 403): “for the Word is God, and He alone has 
the Form of the Father”; ibid., 3.36 (NPNF 2, 4: 414): “For the Father, having given all things 
to the Son, in the Son still hath all things; and the Son having, still the Father hath them; for 
the Son’s Godhead is the Father’s Godhead”; ibid., 2.24 (NPNF 2, 4: 361): “it is proper to the 
Son, to have the things of the Father, and to be such that the Father is seen in Him”; ibid., 3.4 
(NPNF 2, 4: 395): “since they [viz., the Father and the Son] are one, and the Godhead itself 
one, the same things are said of the Son, which are said of the Father . . . for instance, that 
He [viz., the Son] is God, . . . Almighty, . . . and so on with other attributes”; ibid., 3.5 (NPNF 
2, 4: 395–396): “And why are the attributes of the Father ascribed to the Son, except that the 
Son is an Oﬀspring from Him?. . ..And the Son, being the proper Oﬀspring of the Father’s 
Essence, reasonably says that the Father’s attributes are His own also”; ibid., 3.6 (NPNF 2, 4: 
396): “what is said of the Father is also said of the Son, not as accruing to His Essence by grace 
or participation, but because the very Being of the Son is the proper Oﬀspring of the Father’s 
Essence. . . . For the Son is such as the Father is, because He has all that is the Father’s.”
38Athanasius, CA, 1.61 (NPNF 2, 4: 341): “And what does this denote but the Son’s genu-
ineness, and that the Godhead of the Father is the same as the Son’s?”; ibid., 2.41 (NPNF 2, 
4: 370): “the Word of God is One, being the only Son proper and genuine from His Essence, 
and having with His Father the oneness of Godhead indivisible”; ibid., 3.4 (NPNF 2, 4: 395): 
“by way of shewing the identity of Godhead and the unity of Essence. For they [viz., the 
Father and the Son] are one, not as one thing divided into two parts, . . . but the nature is 
one; . . . and all that is the Father’s, is the Son’s”; ibid., 3.4 (NPNF 2, 4: 395): “for if the Son be 
other, as an Oﬀspring, still He is the Same as God; and He and the Father are one in propriety 
and peculiarity of nature, and in the identity of the one Godhead, as has been said. . . . So 
also the Godhead of the Son is the Father’s; whence also it is indivisible; and thus there is 
one God and none other but He”; ibid., 3.22 (NPNF 2, 4: 405): “The Word then has the real 
and true identity of nature with the Father”; DS, 50 (NPNF 2, 4: 477): “plainly the Son is not 
unlike in essence, but coessential with the Father; for if what the Father has is by nature the 
Son’s, and the Son Himself is from the Father, and because of this oneness of godhead and 
of nature He and the Father are one, . . . reasonably is He [viz., the Son] called by the fathers 
‘Coessential’.” Note, though, that for Athanasius, homoousios only goes one way: the Son has 
the Father’s substance, but the Father does not have the Son’s substance. In other words, as 
Stead has noted, homoousios is for Athanasius an asymmetrical relation (Divine Substance, pp. 
260–261).
39Athanasius, CA, 3.4 (NPNF 2, 4: 395): “nor [are the Father and Son one] as one thing 
twice named, . . . for this Sabellius holding was judged an heretic. But They are two, because 
the Father is Father and is not also Son, and the Son is Son and not also Father”; ibid., 3.36 
(NPNF 2, 4: 413): “For let a man, perceiving that the Son has all that the Father hath, from the 
exact likeness and identity of that He hath, should wander into the irreligion of Sabellius, 
considering Him [viz., the Son] to be the Father, . . . He is not the Father, but the Father’s 
398 Faith and Philosophy
though the Father becomes an ingredient in the Son, the Father is still not 
identical to the Son.
Consequently, it seems to me that Athanasius would have to admit that 
the Son is not utterly simple in the way the Father is. For on Athanasius’s 
view, the Son includes a pre-existing ingredient, namely the Father, and 
that ingredient is not identical to the Son. Thus, the Son includes an ingre-
dient that is distinct from himself in some way, while the Father includes 
no ingredients whatsoever. For Athanasisus then, it looks as if the Son 
must be more complex, at least in some sense, than the Father.
Problems
Athanasius’s view raises some interesting questions. One of the things 
Athanasius likes about natural procreation is that sons get their natures 
from one of their ingredients, namely the substance they get from their 
fathers. For example, in God’s case, the Father is an ingredient in the Son, 
and the Son inherits his divine properties from that ingredient. However, 
the Son is not identical to the Father, and it is not clear to me how the Son 
is supposed to inherit properties from something he is not identical to.
Consider an analogous case: a statue and the bronze it is made from.40 
Bronze statues, after all, inherit certain properties from their bronze. For 
instance, a statue has a certain size, shape, and mass because it is made 
from a lump of bronze that has that size, shape, and mass. If we can ex-
plain how statues inherit properties from their bronze, then maybe we can 
explain how the Son inherits properties from the Father.
For convenience, let me call the statue ‘Athena,’ and let me call the 
bronze ‘Lumpel.’ According to what many analytic philosophers call the 
‘standard view’ of material constitution, Lumpel and Athena are two nu-
merically distinct, non-identical objects that share the same material parts 
(at some level of decomposition), and that coincide in the same region 
of space.41
Now, there are certain properties that Lumpel and Athena do not share. 
For instance, they do not share their kind-properties. Lumps of bronze are 
not the same kinds of things as statues. Nor do Lumpel and Athena share 
their modal properties. For example, lumps of bronze can survive being 
melted down and recast, whereas statues cannot.
Word. . . . For if all things [from the Father] are delivered unto Him [viz., the Son], . . . He is 
other than that all which He has received.” For Arius, see his LA (NPNF 2, 4: 458): “He [viz., 
the Father] made Him [viz., the Son], . . . [but not] as Sabellius, dividing the Monad, speaks 
of a Son-and-Father.”
40Richard Cross proposes this helpful analogy in “On Generic and Derivation Views of 
God’s Trinitarian Substance,” Scottish Journal of Theology 56 (2003), pp. 464–480. 
41There are other views of material constitution. For example, as I explained earlier, some 
believe that Lumpel and Athena are identical in some way (e.g., ‘contingently’ or ‘occasion-
ally’). These sorts of views are not relevant here, however, because Athanasius and Arius 
both maintain that the Father and Son are not identical, so if material constitution is going 
to provide a helpful analogy for their views of the Trinity, we will have to stick to theories 
where Lumpel and Athena are not identical. 
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But there are other properties that Lumpel and Athena do share. (And 
here I am not talking about the countless properties that Lumpel and Athena 
share with everything. I am only talking about properties that they share in 
virtue of the fact that they coincide.) For example, Lumpel and Athena share 
material properties like size, shape, and mass. Similarly, Lumpel and Athena 
exist together for a period of time, so they share certain temporal properties 
too. Accordingly, when we say x inherits a property from y, what we mean 
is that x and y share a property in virtue of the fact that they coincide.
Still, what explains why coinciding objects share certain properties but 
not others? I think most would say that coinciding material objects share 
certain kinds of properties because they share certain kinds of parts. For 
example, Lumpel and Athena share material properties because they share 
material parts. But we could also say the same thing about temporal parts. 
The first quarter and the first half of a Notre Dame football game share 
certain temporal parts (e.g., all the seconds of the game’s first quarter), and 
that is why they share certain temporal properties.42
It might be tempting to put this to work in the divine case. For if we 
say that the Godhood is like a divine ‘part,’ then maybe we could say that 
coinciding persons who share that divine ‘part’ would also share divine 
properties. Of course, the Father and the Son share the Godhood (for the 
Father just is the Godhood, and the Son has it as one of his ingredients), so 
ex hypothesi, they would share divine properties too.
But before this strategy could be successful, we would still have to an-
swer more questions. For one thing, this strategy construes the Godhood 
as a ‘part’ rather than a constituent, and it is not obvious that parts are 
related to their wholes in the way that constituents are related to what 
they constitute.
Consider Lumpel and Athena again. Now, it is not exactly clear what 
Athena’s parts are (perhaps they are her particles, perhaps they are her 
arms, legs, and the like), but whatever they are, is Athena related to them 
in the same way that she is related to Lumpel? And in the divine case, is 
the Godhood more like the particles (or arms, legs, etc.) that Athena is 
composed of, or is the Godhood more like Lumpel?
Besides, should we even be thinking about ‘parts’ in God in the first 
place? Many classical authors would say no. Thus, if we want to say that 
coincident objects share certain properties because they share certain 
kinds of parts, we would have a hard time applying that to the Trinity in a 
way that remains faithful to the classical tradition.
But whatever we might want to say about these questions, if we claim 
that coincident objects (or persons) share certain kinds of properties be-
cause they share certain kinds of parts, then we have only identified the 
conditions for shared properties. We have not really explained how those 
properties are shared, and that, it seems to me, is precisely what calls out 
most for explanation here.
42I owe this example to a conversation with Joseph Jedwab. 
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Indeed, when we say that Athena and Lumpel share certain properties, 
what exactly do we mean? Do we mean that those properties are instanti-
ated twice—once in Lumpel, and once in Athena? If so, then suppose that 
Lumpel and Athena share the same weight: e.g., 10kg. If this were instanti-
ated twice, then Lumpel would be 10kg, and Athena would be 10kg too. 
But then the total weight should add up to 20kg, which of course seems 
odd, because our scales only show a total weight of 10kg.
On the other hand, if Lumpel’s and Athena’s shared properties are not 
instantiated twice, then presumably they must be instantiated once. So who 
or what would they be instantiated in? In Lumpel, or in Athena? Either 
way, one of the two would not have a weight, and that seems odd too.
Perhaps one might say that, strictly speaking, shared properties are 
instantiated in neither Lumpel nor Athena, for properties do not ‘inhere’ 
in subjects at all. Rather, what it means for a property to be instantiated 
by something is just for that property to ‘occur’ in that particular region 
of space.
But Lumpel and Athena both occur in the same region of space, and 
so all their properties occur in that same region of space too. Wouldn’t all 
their properties then be shared? That would lead to contradictions. For 
instance, Lumpel can, but Athena cannot, survive being melted down, so 
Athena and Lumpel cannot share such features without contradiction.
Now transfer all of this over to the Trinity. When we say that the Father 
and Son share divine properties, are we saying that those properties are in-
stantiated twice—once in the Father, and once in the Son? Surely that would 
entail that there are two (coincident) Gods, and I just cannot see Athanasius 
agreeing to that. On the other hand, if we think that shared properties are 
only instantiated once, then who would those properties belong to? The Fa-
ther, or the Son? Either way, one of them would not be divine in the proper 
sense, and I do not think Athanasius would agree to that either.
Alternatively, if we think that properties do not ‘inhere’ in subjects but 
rather simply occur in a particular region of space, and assuming that it even 
makes sense to talk about God filling a ‘region of space,’ then wouldn’t the 
Father and Son share all their properties? After all, they both occur in the 
same ‘region of space,’ as it were. If so, that would lead to contradictions. 
For example, the Son is begotten but the Father is not, so the Son cannot 
share the Father’s unbegotteness (I will return to this point in a moment).
Perhaps we could oﬀer Athanasius some help by suggesting that he 
takes a view where, say, Lumpel and Athena are numerically the same, 
but not identical. On this view, the Father and the Son would be numeri-
cally the same, but not identical, and so there would be one God there, not 
two, without the Father and Son being identical. Surely that is just the sort 
of thing Athanasius is after.
Whatever the merits of this strategy, I still have similar questions. In 
what sense are divine properties shared? Would it make any sense to say 
that they are instantiated twice? I wouldn’t think so, for the Father and 
Son are one, and presumably their shared properties are instantiated only 
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‘once’ in some sense too. But if these shared properties are only instanti-
ated once, then again: who or what do they belong to? The Father? The 
Son? Neither? And when we say something like “the Son is omnipotent,” 
do we just mean that “the Son is numerically the same as, but not identical 
to, something that is omnipotent (viz., the Father)”?
I am not suggesting that these questions cannot or have not been an-
swered. Nor am I trying to raise objections to the general coherence of 
any of these views of material constitution. In fact, I think comparing the 
problem of material constitution to the problem of the Trinity is very help-
ful. Rather, I am querying for a more detailed account of how, precisely, 
these properties are shared, and asking these sorts of questions is one way 
to start thinking about that. For the time being, however, it is not clear 
exactly how or in what sense Athanasius thinks the Father and Son are 
supposed to share divine properties, but that, as I said above, is precisely 
what calls out most for explanation here.
Still, even if Athanasius could explain how the Son inherits properties 
from the Father, there is another problem. Like Arius, Athanasius believes 
that the Father is simple, and so anything ‘in’ the Father is, strictly speak-
ing, identical to the Father. Consequently, if the Son is going to inherit any 
properties from the Father, then surely he would have to inherit them all. 
As Athanasius himself realizes, it is not a question of the Son inheriting 
part of the Father. It is a question of all or none.
However, there are certain properties the Son cannot inherit from the 
Father, on pain of contradiction.43 As I mentioned earlier, the Son cannot 
inherit the Father’s unbegotteness without contradiction, for the Son is be-
gotten, but the Father is not. Similarly, the Son cannot inherit the Father’s 
fatherhood without contradiction either, for that would make the Son the 
Father of himself, even though he is not the Father of himself.44
One might interject that the Son inherits only the Father’s divine proper-
ties and not his personal properties like fatherhood. Unfortunately, Atha-
nasius frequently says that the Father (who, recall, is God) is essentially a 
Father.45 When he says this, he is reacting to Arius. As Athanasius sees it, 
43Richard Cross points this problem out in “Generic and Derivation Views,” p. 469. 
44To his credit, Athanasius does claim that the Son inherits all of the Father’s properties 
except the Father’s fatherhood. CA, 3.4 (NPNF 2, 4: 395): “And so, . . . the same things are said 
of the Son, which are said of the Father, except His being said to be Father”; DS, 49 (NPNF 2, 
4: 476): “what is said of the Father, is said in Scripture of the Son also, all but His being called 
Father . . . as for instance, the name God, . . . Almighty, [etc.]. . . . And in a word, all that you 
find said of the Father, so much will you find said of the Son, all but His being Father.” The 
problem is, however, that Athanasius does not explain how this is possible. Unless Athana-
sius can provide a principled way to show why the Son only inherits some but not all of the 
Father’s properties, then saying that the Son inherits everything from the Father except his 
fatherhood seems rather ad hoc.
45For example, CA, 1.28 (NPNF 2, 4: 323): “Wherefore He is ever Father, nor is the charac-
ter of Father adventitious to God, lest He seem alterable”; ibid., 1.29 (NPNF 2, 4: 323): “And a 
man may be and may be called Maker, though the works are not yet; but father he cannot be 
called, nor can he be, unless a son exist”; ibid., 3.66 (NPNF 2, 4: 430): “But to say of the Son, 
‘He might not have been’, is an irreligious presumption reaching even to the Essence of the 
Father, as if what is His own might not have been. For it is the same as saying, ‘The Father 
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Arius seems to think that God became a Father when he begat the Son, and 
that implies that God can change (e.g., from not being a Father to being a 
Father).46 But since God cannot change, Athanasius insists that the Father 
is essentially a Father.47
I take it, then, that Athanasius thinks the Father’s essential properties 
include his fatherhood in addition to divine properties like omnipotence, 
goodness, and so forth.48 Consequently, since the Father is utterly simple, 
if the Son inherits the Father’s nature, then surely the Son would inherit all 
(not just some) of the Father’s essential properties, and that would include 
his fatherhood.
Thus, it looks as if the Father’s utter simplicity means that the Son must 
inherit all or none of the Father’s properties. But since there are at least one 
or two properties that the Son cannot inherit, it would seem to follow that 
the Son cannot inherit any of the Father’s properties. Unless Athanasius 
can oﬀer a principled way to explain why the Son inherits only some of 
the Father’s properties but not others, then his theory will collapse into 
contradictions and impossibility.
(I have focused my attention here on divine properties like omnipo-
tence and goodness, but those are not the only features I wonder about. 
What about God’s intellect and will? Does Athanasius think the Son inher-
its the Father’s intellect and will too?49 If Athanasius cannot explain how 
might not have been good’. And as the Father is always good by nature, so He is always 
generative by nature.” 
46Athanasius spends a good deal of time in Book 1 of the CA trying to show that Arius’s 
view implies that the Father was not always a Father. For example, 1.11 (NPNF 2, 4: 312): “In 
this difficulty, you [viz., Arius] can but answer, that there was a time when the Word was not; 
for your very adverb ‘once’ naturally signifies this.” In response, Athanasius insists that the 
Father is essentially a Father, and so he was always a Father, e.g., ibid., 1.25 (NPNF 2, 4: 321): 
“Whereas God is, He was eternally; since then the Father is ever, His Radiance ever is, which is 
His Word. And again, God who is, hath from Himself His word who also is; and neither hath 
the Word been added, whereas he was not before”; ibid., 1.29 (NPNF 2, 4: 323): “But the Son, 
not being a work, but proper to the Father’s oﬀspring, always is; for, whereas the Father always 
is, so what is proper to His essence must always be; and this is His Word and his Wisdom.” 
47Athanasius, CA, 1.35 (NPNF 2, 4: 327): “For the Father is unalterable and unchangeable, 
and is always in the same state and the same”; ibid., 1.14 (NPNF 2, 4: 314): “For never was the 
essence of the Father imperfect, that what is proper to it should be added afterwards; nor, 
as man from man, has the Son been begotten, so as to be later than His Father’s existence, 
but He is God’s oﬀspring, and as being proper Son of God [viz., the Father], who is ever, He 
[viz., the Son] exists eternally”; ibid., 1.19 (NPNF 2, 4: 317): “but as to the Son, He is such as 
the Father is, of whose essence He is proper Oﬀspring, Word, and Wisdom. For this is proper 
to the Son, as regards the Father, and this shews that the Father is proper to the Son; that we 
may neither say that God was ever without Word, nor that the Son was non-existent.”
48Athanasius, DS, 34 (NPNF 2, 4: 469): “If when you name the Father, or use the word 
‘God’, you do not signify essence, or understand Him according to essence, . . . and so, 
shrinking from saying that God is truly Father, and making Him compound who is simple, 
in a material way, you will be authors of a newer blasphemy”; ibid., 35 (NPNF 2, 4: 469): “But 
if, when we hear it said, ‘I am that I am’ [Ex. 3:14], . . . we understand nothing else than the 
very simple, and blessed, and incomprehensible essence itself of Him that is, (for though we 
be unable to master what He is, yet hearing ‘Father’, and ‘God’, and ‘Almighty’, we under-
stand nothing else to be meant than very essence of Him that is).”
49It seems to me that Athanasius thinks the Son does inherit (at least some of) his knowl-
edge from the Father. See, for instance, CA, 3.44 (NPNF 2, 4: 418): “And again, if all that is the 
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the Son gets his intellect and will, then how could the Son be a person? 
Surely a person has to have an intellect and will.)
Conclusion
All of this illustrates two basic issues that any account of the Trinity might 
face when it tries to explain how one divine person produces another. 
First, we need to think carefully before we identify the Godhood with any 
one divine person. As the old saying goes, that would “confound the es-
sence with the persons.” If we do identify the Godhood with any one di-
vine person, then we still need to explain how the other persons inherit 
divine properties, and as I hope is evident by now, that is no easy task.50
One way to avoid this whole problem is just to say that the Godhood 
is an ingredient that all three persons share, but which is not absolutely 
identical to any of them (or at least is not identified with one more than the 
others). Of course, this entails saying that the Father is not utterly simple, 
for he will have a distinct ingredient within himself, namely the Godhood. 
But I see no problem with this. If it is okay to say that the Godhood is an 
ingredient in the Son (as Athanasius claims), then surely it is okay to say 
that the Godhood is an ingredient in the Father too.
However, some theologians find this idea worrisome. As they see it, 
if we say that the Godhood is some kind of distinct ingredient that is not 
identified with at least one of the persons, then it looks as if there are four 
things there, namely the Father, Son, and Spirit, plus the Godhood itself. 
And that, in turn, makes the persons look irrelevant. After all, all the really 
good stuﬀ (like omnipotence and omniscience) belongs to the Godhood, 
so what need is there for the persons?51
I think this is a very important worry, but I am not sure it provides 
enough reason to identify the Godhood with one person more than the 
others. For we would still be left with two persons who ‘inherit’ the God-
hood, and we would need to explain why those two persons would not 
Father’s, is the Son’s (and this He Himself has said), and it is the Father’s attribute to know 
the day [when creation ends], it is plain that the Son too knows it, having this proper to Him 
from the Father.” 
50Éphrem Boularand puts it well (L’Hérésie d’Arius et la «Foi» de Nicée, 2 volumes [Par-
is: Letouzey & Ané, 1972–1973], 1: 68): “this confounds the essence and the person, for it 
makes the personal properties of the Father into the perfections of the divine substance. 
For one cannot say that God is ‘ingenerate’ and ‘without a source’ without denying the 
divinity of the Son, for he is ‘generate’ and comes from a ‘source’” (my translation). At this 
point in his narrative, Boularand is talking about Arius, but the comment applies just as 
much to Athanasius. 
51Karl Rahner, Colin Gunton, and John Zizioulas are just three examples of modern theo-
logians who have this worry. See Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: 
Crossroad Herder, 1999), p. 17; Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1991), p. 54; and John Zizioulas, Being as Communion (Crestwood, New York: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), p. 17. Of course, this is not a modern worry. In the twelfth 
century, for instance, there was a dispute between Joachim of Fiore and Peter Lombard on 
this very issue. See Fiona Robb, “Intellectual Tradition and Misunderstanding: The Develop-
ment of Academic Theology on the Trinity in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, University College, London, 1993.
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be subordinate to the other one. Besides, to say that the Godhood should 
not be identified with one person more than the others does not necessar-
ily mean that the Godhood will somehow then be superior to the persons. 
My free will is not the same as my person, but that does not make it more 
superior and me irrelevant.
In any case, the worry is there. Whatever the Godhood is, it is a pretty 
awesome entity, so we should be careful not to ascribe it too much inde-
pendence at the expense of the persons. The point I want to make here is 
simply that identifying the Godhood with one person over the others is 
not the way I would avoid this worry.
The second issue is this: how do we distinguish between producing a 
divine person and creating something out of nothing? The Creeds are em-
phatically clear that the Son is not created out of nothing, so any account 
of the Son’s production that aims to be faithful to the Creeds would, I 
think, want to show how the Son is not created.52
It seems to me that this is an important question for so-called ‘social 
views’ of the Trinity, where the divine persons are distinct individuals that 
form a social collective. On such views, it looks as if the persons are entirely 
distinct individuals in the sense that they do not share any ingredients (in 
my sense of the word).53 But if that is right, then the Father would have to 
produce the Son without any pre-existing ingredients, and by my defini-
tion of creation, that would mean that the Son is created from nothing.
One might object that an advocate of the social view could argue that 
the Son is necessarily produced eternally, and since the Son is necessary 
and does not begin to exist at some point in time, he is not created. Howev-
er, as I said earlier, many philosophers throughout history have believed 
that creation is, in fact, necessary and eternal. So why isn’t the social ac-
count of the Son’s production a similar case?
In closing, let me just say that although I have only discussed what 
Arius and Athanasius have to say about how the Son is produced, they are 
not the only theologians with interesting theories about this. The history 
of the doctrine of the Trinity is filled with intense debate about the Son’s 
generation, and much of that discussion remains untapped.54
Georgetown University
52The Nicene Creed says this: “We believe in . . . the Son of God,. . . . And those who say . . . 
that he came from things that were not [in existence] . . . these the catholic and apostolic church 
anathematises” (The Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 2 volumes, ed. Norman Tanner [Lon-
don: Sheed and Ward, and Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990], 1: 5/*5).
53For instance, Richard Swinburne holds this view, as far as I can tell. See The Christian God 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 170–191.
54I want to thank Greg Spendlove, Mark Henninger, Dale Tuggy, Joseph Jedwab, Michael 
Rea, Richard Cross, Thomas Flint, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier 
drafts (in whole or part) of this paper. It is much improved as a consequence. All errors are 
mine. 
